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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL COMMISSION
The South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission
issues all retail permits authorizing the sale of beer and wine.' In
determining whether to grant a permit, the commission must
ascertain, among other things, the suitability of the retailer's
business location.2 The legislature intended to vest in the com-
mission a rather broad discretion in evaluating the fitness or suit-
ability of a particular location.3 Furthermore, the commission's
exercise of discretion may not be altered by the courts unless its
determination is wholly without evidentiary support.4 On two
recent occasions, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed
commission determinations of unsuitable location and subse-
quent denials of retail permits.
In Fowler v. Lewis, 5 the supreme court discerned ample evi-
dence to support the commission's denial of a retail beer and wine
permit and reversed the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Fow-
ler, the operator of a large grocery store and laundrette at a five-
cornered intersection ii Union, South Carolina, applied to the
commission for an unconditional permit which would allow the
sale of chilled beer for off premises consumption only. The com-
mission denied the application on the grounds of unsuitable loca-
tion. Although other businesses were located at all corners of the
intersection, the surrounding area was predominantly residential.
Several low-cost housing projects were nearby and Fowler's estab-
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-211 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
Every person engaged in the business of selling beer, ale, porter, wine or any
beverage which has been declared to be nonalcoholic and nonintoxicating under
the provisions of § 4-201 shall apply to the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage
Control Commission for a permit to sell such beverages. . . . Retail dealers
shall pay to the Commission forty dollars per annum for retail permits ....
But retail permits may be issued by the Commission for the sale of beer for
consumption off of the premises of the retailer for five dollars per annum.
2. Id. § 4-212 (1962) provides:
No permit authorizing the sale of beer and wine shall be issued unless:
(6) The location of the proposed place of business of applicant shall in the
opinion of the. . . Commission be a proper one.
3. Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 189 S.E.2d 301 (1972). See Administrative Law, 25
S.C.L. RaV. 319, 324-26 (1973) for a full discussion of Smith.
4. Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
5. 260 S.C. 54, 194 S.E.2d 191 (1973).
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lishments were surrounded by a large parking area. The parking
area was bounded on the rear by an unused school and play-
ground. Because Fowler's businesses remained open until late
hours, people from the surrounding residential area tended to
congregate in the laundrette and parking area.
Issuance of the permit was opposed by Union's Chief of Po-
lice, his assistant, and a patrolman. All three testified that the
granting of an unconditional permit with a voluntary stipulation
allowing the sale of chilled beer for off premises consumption
would create an additional burden on local law enforcement. Ac-
cording to the police officers, arrests for drunkenness and fighting
were numerous and automobile accidents frequent on the prem-
ises. They also testified that policing of the parking lot and sur-
rounding area would be difficult for a small police department.
The record thus clearly demonstrated that, with no cold beer
available in the area, congregations of people on Fowler's prop-
erty were frequently accompanied by consumption of alcohol and
public disorder. The supreme court, in reversing the lower court,
found that the commision could have reasonably inferred from
the testimony of record that, by making cold beer readily avail-
able, the situation would be exacerbated. Consequently, substan-
tial evidence supported the commission's determination that
Fowler's business location was unsuitable.
Although the court in Fowler needed only to determine
whether the commission's decision was without evidentiary sup-
port, it missed an opportunity to provide future reviewing courts
with some guidance as to what types of evidence may properly
reflect upon the suitability of a business location. As applied to
the facts of Fowler, the court could have looked to legislative
standards governing the issuance of retail liquor licenses for guid-
ance. In granting retail liquor licenses, the legislature directs the
commission to refuse issuance "unless the commission is assured
that such locality is under proper police protection."' 7 Similarly,
6. See Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 189 S.E.2d 301 (1972). In Smith the court looked
to such legislative standards for guidance to the contention that a beer and wine permit
should not be granted to a business located one thousand feet from Epworth Children's
Home. Since S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-33.1 (1962) barred the granting of liquor licenses to
establishments located within three hundred feet of any church, school, orplayground, it
would be illogical to bar issuance of a permit for nonalcoholic beverage sales solely on the
basis of proximity to an institution possessing elements of all three when the distance
involved was three times as much as the minimum distance with respect to alcoholic
liquor licenses.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-37 (1962).
[Vol. 26
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
the legislature has also directed the commission to ". . . take into
account . . .the likelihood that large crowds will gather from
time to time with attendant breaches of the peace, [and] re-
quirements of increased law enforcement officers" before granting
a permit for the sale of beer and wine at a location within five
miles of a foreign state which prohibits such sales.' Of course,
neither statutory directive would be controlling in this instance;
both, however, would be persuasive in arguing that increased
burdens on local law enforcement, with lessened assurance of
proper police protection, rendered Fowler's business location un-
suitable.9
In Taylor v. Lewis,'0 the commission's determination that a
business location was unsuitable for a beer permit allowing the
sale of chilled beer for off premises consumption only was re-
versed as entirely unsupported by the evidence. Taylor operated
a combination grocery store, gasoline station, and fishing supply
center about one-fourth mile from Lake Greenwood. The sur-
rounding community was about half residential and half busi-
ness. There were six establishments possessing beer permits
within a mile of Taylor's store. One such establishment was
within two hundred feet of the applicant's location and allowed
consumption of beer on the premises. Moreover, Taylor's neigh-
borhood store had been operating with a beer permit for over five
years prior to the present application." In denying issuance of a
permit for the sale of chilled beer, the commission did not con-
sider any evidence showing the location to be less suitable for the
sale of beer at the time of the application than during the preced-
ing five years. Those who opposed Taylor's application asserted
that the issuance of a beer license would be detrimental to the
well-being of the community and that the location lacked ade-
quate police protection.' 2 The court, however, agreeing with the
8. Id. § 4-212.1.
9. See Terry v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 177, 187 S.E.2d 884 (1972).
10. 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973).
11. Taylor began business at the location in 1967, at which time the commission
granted him a retail license for the sale and consumption of beer on the premises. Taylor
operated the store under such a permit for three years until he sold the store to a third
party. The new owner also received a permit and operated the store for a period of two
years. Taylor repurchased the store and made the present application for a retail permit
"to chill beer for sale for off premises consumption only."
12. The witnesses gave several reasons as the basis of their claims: (1) the location
would be visited by persons who were intoxicated and would disturb people in nearby
residential areas; (2) the safety of children in the area would be threatened; (3) the danger
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lower court, noted that the relevant testimony consisted entirely
of opinions and conclusions which were not supported by any
facts. In comparision with Fowler, no disturbances of the peace
or congregations of people had previously occurred at the loca-
tion. No representative of local law enforcement testified as to the
availability of adequate police protection. The most significant
and distinguishing feature between the two cases, however, was
the ready availability of chilled beer in the immediate area.
In reversing the commission's decision on suitability of loca-
tion, the lower court issued an order directing the commission to
grant Taylor a permit to chill beer for sale for off premises con-
sumption only. On its appeal to the supreme court, the commis-
sion argued that the lower court had no authority to issue such
an order since the commission could not lawfully grant a condi-
tional license. 3 The commission claimed that it had the authority
to issue only two types of permits-an unconditional one and a
restricted one "for the sale of beer for consumption off the prem-
ises of the retailer."" Pursant to its legislative authority,', the
commission had promulgated rules governing the issuance of re-
tail licenses and had provided:
Retail dealers who are holders of permits to sell beer for
consumption off of the premises are hereby prohibited from hav-
ing chilled beer on the premises of their establishment.
A violation of the foregoing shall be grounds for the suspen-
sion or revocation of any such permit."
Consequently, the commission maintained that a permit for the
sale of chilled beer was a hybrid permit not authorized by statute
or regulation. The hybrid permit was less than an unconditional
(5) two churches were located in the area; (6) the property values in the area would drop;
(7) the area was without adequate police protection; and (8) the front yards of some of
the witnesses had been littered with beer cans thrown by passing motorists.
13. The commission had raised this same issue in Fowler but the court never reached
its merits since Fowler's business location was found to be unsuitable. In Taylor the court
likewise did not consider the issue because the Commission had not raised it at any stage
of the prior proceedings and the issue was not deemed properly before the court.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-211 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See n. 1 supra.
15. Id. § 4-27.6 provides:
The South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission is authorized
to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the duties
imposed upon the Commission by law which, when duly promulgated, shall
have the full force of law.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. A.B.C. Comm'n B.W. Reg. No. 20 (Cum. Supp. 1973). The Tax
[Vol. 26
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authorization to sell beer at retail, but more than a permit to sell
hot beer for off premises consumption only. The commission con-
cluded that "neither the Commission nor the court below had the
power to impose upon the license sought any restriction, limita-
tion or condition, be it agreed to or not by the applicant, and such
would be nugatory." 7
Clearly, the issuance of a permit for the retail sale of chilled
beer for off premises consumption is a hybrid permit which has
qualities of both an unconditional permit and a restricted permit
for the sale of hot beer for off premises consumption. The commis-
sion's argument in its brief is of special significance because the
commission freely admits having issued hundreds of these hybrid
permits,'8 frequently granting them in the form of unconditional
permits with the applicant's voluntary stipulation that the
chilled beer will be sold only for off premises consumption. 9 The
commission has also maintained that its past willingness to con-
sider and issue such hybrid permits with voluntary stipulations
cannot supersede the statutes and its own regulations.2 1 In short,
the commission claimed that it has granted permits for the sale
of chilled beer for off premises consumption which were beyond
its power and authority to issue.
The commission's argument that a hybrid permit violates
the statutory provisions and its own regulations is unfounded.
The legislature has explicitly provided for only two types of retail
beer and wine licenses." One type of permit costs forty dollars
and carries no specific restrictions; the other type of permit costs
Commission promulgated an identical regulation when it was authorized to issue retail
beer permits prior to the creation of the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Com-
mission. Since the new regulation was made close to the time of agency formation, when
the statute was re-enacted to create the A.B.C. Commission, the regulation carries a
strong presumption that it is based upon legislative intent. Consequently, a court in
reviewving the regulation would be hesitant to substitute its own determination of legisla-
tive intent for that supplied by the commission. See generally Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
17. Brief for Appellant at 10, Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973).
18. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801
(1973); accord, Brief for Appellant at 10.
19. In Taylor an application for an unconditional permit which would allow on prem-
ises consumption was rejected, but the commission allowed Taylor to submit the present
application with such a voluntary stipulation and considered that application in a routine
fashion rather than rejecting it out of hand as beyond its power to grant.
20. Brief for Appellant at 10, Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973).
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five dollars and allows the sale of beer for consumption off the
premises of the retailer. 2 The commission's regulation
prohibiting possession of chilled beer under a retail permit to sell
beer for consumption off the premises applies only to the five
dollar permit.23 Pursuant to its legislative authority to promul-
gate rules and regulations which have the force of law,24 the com-
mission has approved the use of voluntary stipulations:
Any stipulation and/or agreement which is voluntarily en-
tered into by an applicant in writing for a beer and wine permit
between the applicant and the South Carolina Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Commission, if accepted by the Commission, will be
incorporated into the basic requirements for the enjoyment and
privilege of obtaining and retaining the beer and wine permit
and which shall have the same effect as any and all laws and
any and all other regulations pertaining to the effective adminis-
tration of beer and wine permits and permittees.
In the event that evidence is presented to this Commission
that any part of the stipulation or agreement is or has been
knowingly broken by the permittee will be a violation against
the permit and shall constitute sufficient grounds to suspend or
revoke said beer and wine permit [sic].Y
Since this regulation does not conflict with the commission's sta-
tutory authority" and the commission has already issued
hundreds of unconditional permits with voluntary stipulations,
27
the commission's position is without merit.
II. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Under the Social Security Act 2s claimants for disability bene-
fits must prove disability to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
22. Id.
23. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973).
Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-211 (Cum. Supp. 1973) with S.C. CODE ANN. A.B.C.
Comm'n B.W. Reg. No. 20 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-27.6 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See n. 15, supra.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. A.B.C. Comm'n B.W. Reg. No. 31 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-211 (Cum. Supp. 1973) does not expressly prohibit the use
of voluntary stipulations. Moreover, the broad legislative grant of authority given to the
commission in S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-27.6 evinces legislative recognition that restrictions on
"unconditional" permits are, by the peculiar nature of beer and wine consumption control,
not only necessary but desirable. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Fowler v. Lewis, 260
S.C. 54, 194 S.E.2d 191 (1973).
27. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. 99 301 et seq. (1962).
[Vol. 26
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Health, Education and Welfare under a two-fold test. There must
be both a showing of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment and the impairment must be such as to render the
claimant unable to engage in substantial gainful employment. 9
In reviewing decisions of the Secretary, the scope of judicial re-
view by the federal courts is narrow; "the findings of the Secre-
tary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive."3 Courts, however, will not accept the Secretary's
findings blindly. A claimant's statutory right of review31 contem-
plates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of administrative
action. A critical and searching examination of the record should
be made and the Secretary's decision set aside when necessary to
insure a result consistent with congressional intent and elemental
fairness.
3 2
Despite harsh congressional criticism of some federal deci-
sions affirming the findings of the Secretary,33 the courts have
been increasingly critical of administrative findings in recent
cases. In Black v. Richardson claimant's application for disabil-
ity benefits was denied by the Secretary. Claimant, a forty-four
year old textile worker with only six years of education, had con-
tracted bronchiectasis which ultimately led to the surgical re-
moval of one-third of her lung tissue. At the administrative hear-
ing, the claimant submitted the report of an examining physician
29. Harris v. Richardson, 450 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1972). See e.g., Orr v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C.
1966). The phrase "substantial evidence" has been defined in Laws v. Celebrezze, 368
F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966), to mean:
• .. evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a
particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but
may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a
refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is "substantial
evidence."
31. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1970).
32. Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1969).
33. See Floyd v. Finch, 441 F.2d 73, (6th Cir. 1971); accord, Garrett v. Richardson,
471 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1972). In Floyd the court noted:
It used to be easy enough for an appellate court to affirm an administrative
agency on the ground that the findings were supported "by substantial evi-
dence," if it could find just a trace of evidence to support them. But that is not
the case anymore. Congress grew .critical of such affirmances which ignored
conflicting evidence and, in turn, brought about harsh criticism of the courts
for such decisions on the ground that cases were affirmed merely because the
appellate court could find evidence in the record which, viewed in isolation,
substantiated a Board's findings.
441 F.2d at 76.
34. 356 F. Supp. 861 (D.S.C. 1973).
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who had conducted certain tests to determine claimant's lung
capacity. 5 The physician's report contained neither an evalua-
tion of the test results nor comments upon their significance.
Since hearing examiners are normally laymen, the courts have
allowed the use of independent, neutral medical advisers to ex-
plain complex medical problems in terms understandable to the
layman-examiner. Medical advisers who are usually board certi-
fied specialists and who are paid a fee by the government are used
in approximately thirteen percent of all disability hearings. While
these advisers may offer opinions, they must also be neutral in
their attitude.36 In Black the hearing examiner's medical adviser
interpreted the results of the pulmonary function studies at the
hearing, but repeatedly expressed surprise over what he termed
"illogical" results. In so doing, the court voiced doubts as to
whether the medical adviser was giving advice or testifying.
In view of the questionable test results and the hearing exam-
iner's obvious reliance upon them, the court was unable to deter-
mine, as a matter of law, if the Secretary's findings were sup-
ported by substantial evidence and remanded the case for further
proceedings. In Black, the court was highly critical of the conduct
of the hearing and so stated in no uncertain terms:
This court could not help but note with some concern the man-
ner in which the hearing in this case was conducted. From the
record it appears that every effort was made to accommodate
the hearing examiner's medical . . . adviser's time schedules to
the total disregard and disruption of the plaintiffs testimony.
While it is understandable that professional men have busy
schedules and command high fees for their time, it must not be
forgotten that taxpayers and claimants too are entitled to con-
sideration by the government which exists to serve them ...
[Ihe district courts are already overburdened with cases with-
out having to correct every examiner's decision for the misuse
or complete disregard of correct standards in cases such as this."
The critical tone of federal decisions continued in Byrd v.
35. The test was a Respiratory Functions Study using the Air-Shields Pulmonary
Function Recorder which records test results in the form of a graph. These graphs were
attached to the report introduced into evidence.
36. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The use of
medical advisers was strongly criticized by Mr. Justice Douglas who stated, "The use by
HEW of its stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross examination is the
cutting of corners-a practice in which certainly the Government should not indulge." Id.
at 414.
37. 356 F. Supp. at 872. But see Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1972),
[Vol. 26
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Richardson38 where the court again chastised the hearing exam-
iner. The claimant, who suffered an arthritic condition of the
spine and hands, alleged that she was unable to return to her
previous employment and was totally disabled. The hearing ex-
aminer relied upon one medical report which described claim-
ant's condition as minimal. He concluded that the claimant did
experience some discomfort but was not totally disabled by her
condition and could perform light or sedentary work duties. 9 In
reviewing the record, the district court noticed that another medi-
cal report directly conflicted with both the examiner's conclu-
sions and the first medical report. Moreover, the court expressed
concern that the record contained references to other medical
reports which could resolve the conflict but which the examiner
made no effort to include in the record. In remanding to the
Secretary for the purpose of obtaining and considering these other
records, the court observed:
It is clear that the initial burden is upon the plaintiff to
prove that he is disabled under the Act ... and that a part of
this burden is to produce for consideration adequate medical
evidence to support the claimed disability. A countervailing
consideration however is the duty of impartiality and basic fair-
ness which is imposed on the hearing examiner. The hearing
examiner is not the secretary's advocate, but is given authority
as an impartial trier of fact. . . . This court is of the opinion
however that, as the hearing examiner had knowledge from re-
ports before him of other medical reports bearing directly on the
alleged impairment, he should have specifically requested the
subject records. 0
where the court set aside the lower court's judgment that the Secretary's findings were
unsupported by substantial evidence. In Blalock, claimant argued that she became disa-
bled prior to 1964 when she last met the eligibility requirements. Although some evidence
existed to show that claimant suffered arthritis, a severe neurosis, and an inadequate
personality, the hearing examiner was justified in relying upon his medical adviser who
interpreted the evidence as showing that claimant had a gradual and progressive illness
but that it had not reached a disabling stage prior to the expiration of her insured status.
38. 362 F. Supp. 957 (D.S.C. 1973).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1972) provides:
... an individual. . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
40. 362 F. Supp. at 963. In Garrett v. Richardson, 363 F. Supp. 83 (D.S.C. 1973) the
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It would appear that the courts are no longer willing to approve
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's decisions with-
out being convinced that findings are, on the whole record, based
upon substantial evidence. Indeed, the courts appear willing to
remand or reverse such decisions more than ever before.4 ' A crit-
ical approach by the courts, moreover, comports with the basic
premise of the Social Security Act and is more amenable to a
liberal construction of the Act in favor of claimants.
ROBERT E. SALANE
results. In Garrett, the examiner was criticized in several respects. First, the examiner's
failure to obtain two medical reports for the record was found not to comport with a full,
fair, and impartial development of the facts. Second, the examiner's decision that the
claimant could perform light work was unsupported speculation in the absence of testi-
mony by a vocational expert. Despite the ability of the examiner to take administrative
notice of the existence of light and sedentary work in the national economy, the record
reflected no testimony indicating the claimant could perform such work.
41. The critical trend of court decisions does not seem to be restricted to disability
hearings. In Delk v. Richardson, 365 F. Supp. 627 (D.S.C. 1973), the court reversed the
Secretary's decision denying payment of benefits for in-patient services under the medi-
care program. Although the claimant had not been treated in a hospital which was eligible
for program payments, her admission to a nonparticipating hospital, which was the only
available hospital equipped to treat multiple facial fractures, was necessary to prevent
serious impairment to her health. The court noted that the only other hospital which could
treat such injuries under the medicare program was the Medical College of Charleston
Hospital which takes patients only on a selective basis.
10
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